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It wasn’t meant to be like this, but India-U.S. relations went from firm to shaky ground in the first year of President Donald Trump’s second term. 

Even though 2025 started with a successful visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and a lengthy joint statement filled with promises to build better, shine brighter, and add more strength to the relationship, it ends on a grim note. The warmth has dissipated, the optimism is absent, trust has taken a severe beating, and sunny predictions are in the dustbin. 

The background is equally worrisome, with hatred against India and Indian Americans rising among Trump’s MAGA base. The virulence—partly promoted by Pakistani, Chinese, and Qatari bots on X—has hit even Vice President J.D. Vance, whose wife, Usha, is Indian American. From being a celebrated minority group, Indian Americans are being targeted with a vengeance. 

With the diaspora in distress and diplomats unable to find a fix, what remains is a functional skeleton of a once robust relationship—mid-level officials still meet, trying hard to keep things going but with the knowledge that the spirit is broken.

As 2025 closes, India is under 50 percent tariffs, the highest imposed by Trump against any country and less than the 47 percent against China. The difference in tariffs tells the whole story in short. When a hitherto competitor or “near peer” faces lower duties than a strategic partner long hailed as a counterbalance to China, something is drastically wrong.

The tariff burden on India and the lack of a trade deal with Washington are the main takeaways from the past 12 months. Despite multiple rounds of negotiations and endless video calls, the two sides were unable to sign a deal. Indian officials say the agreement is ready and awaits Trump’s nod, but U.S. officials insist differences persist even though they admit that this is the best offer they are likely to get from Delhi.

India, meanwhile, appears to have moved on after a period of grief and mourning. It’s aggressively seeking new markets and signing trade deals with other countries—New Zealand, Oman, and the UK signed up this year. That’s the silver lining despite the dark clouds over India-U.S. relations—a more open trade policy by Delhi and a greater willingness to take risks. 

Projecting economic growth and confidence, India also attracted U.S. tech investments to the tune of multiple billions, even if a trade deal remained elusive. Interestingly, Indian exports to the U.S. grew by 22 percent in Nov. 2025 despite Trump’s tariffs. The stricter H-1B visa policies may have a similar effect—more U.S. jobs shifting overseas. 

The failure to conclude a trade deal was accompanied by endless political pain in Delhi caused by Trump’s insistence that he alone was responsible for the ceasefire between India and Pakistan after the May 2025 conflict. He has repeated his claim no fewer than 50 times along with assertions about ending eight or nine other wars around the world. 

Pakistan eagerly gave him credit; India did not. The vibe changed, and it remains a question whether Delhi should have handled Trump differently rather than going by the book. Many friends of India in DC believe Modi should have been the “adult” in the room. 

But it is what it is. Delhi’s political compulsions and Trump’s vanity could not be reconciled, and the relationship will suffer the fallout. Although the two leaders talked at least four times by phone and pretended all was well in statements on X, it wasn’t. 

India was supposed to host the annual Quad summit this year with the leaders of Australia, Japan, and the U.S., but Trump had no time or inclination to travel to New Delhi. He hasn’t said anything about the Quad, a grouping that he revived in his first term with fanfare. In his second term, the Quad seems to have slid into near oblivion, at least for now. That the Quad “working groups” continued to meet this year is hardly a consolation.  

Quad was meant to ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a rule-based order, and act as a measure against China’s aggressive tactics in the region and beyond. Trump was credited with forcing strategic clarity about China in his first term only to abandon his own approach in the second. The dramatic makeover has left friends and allies like India and Japan distraught. 

The much-anticipated National Security Strategy—a document outlining presidential priorities—was hardly reassuring for Delhi. India appeared to be an “also ran” and an afterthought with a role to be decided if circumstances permit. Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy will likely be determined by Trump’s goals with China and his posture on a given day. 

If India had a bad first year with Trump, Pakistan had a good one. Using both skill and sycophancy in equal measure, Pakistan renewed its relevance, offered crypto and mining deals, delivered a wanted terrorist, nominated Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize, and deployed scores of lobbyists to gain access to the White House. In return, Pakistan’s de facto ruler and army chief, Asim Munir, ate lunch with Trump, got low tariffs, almost a billion in upgrades for his F-16s and AMRAAM missiles, and a role in the Middle East with U.S. and Saudi blessings. 

It's possible that 2026 brings more pain than gain for India, but it is also possible that a leader as unpredictable as Trump changes his tone and tenor.

The author is a Washington, DC-based columnist specializing in foreign policy and author of “Friends With Benefits: The India-US Story.”

(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of India Abroad.)